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ABSTRACT
We study optimal portfolio choice in a two-country model where assets represent claims on future
consumption and facilitate trade in markets with imperfect credit. Assuming that foreign assets trade
at a cost, agents hold relatively more domestic assets. Consequently, agents have larger claims to domestic
over foreign consumption. Moreover, foreign assets turn over faster than domestic assets because the
former have desirable liquidity properties, but represent inferior saving tools. Our mechanism offers
an answer to a long-standing puzzle in international finance: a positive relationship between consumption
and asset home bias coupled with higher turnover rates of foreign over domestic assets.
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Agents’ international portfolio choices have been a major topic of research in macroeconomics
over the past two decades. The vast majority of papers emphasize the role that foreign assets
play in helping agents diversify domestic income risk. While the role of assets in hedging con-
sumption risk is admittedly crucial, an equally important characteristic of assets, their liquidity,
has been overlooked by the literature. In this paper, we develop a theoretical framework that
allows us to study how liquidity properties of assets shape agents’ international portfolios. A
concrete concept of asset liquidity is, therefore, required.
To that end, we employ a model in the tradition of monetary-search theory, extended to
include real assets and trade between countries. Agents have access to alternating rounds of
centralized, or Walrasian, markets and decentralized markets, where trade occurs in a bilat-
eral fashion and credit is imperfect. In each country’s Walrasian market, domestic and foreign
agents can buy assets of that country at the ongoing market price. More interestingly, agents
can bring a portfolio of assets to each country’s decentralized market and trade it for locally-
produced goods. Hence, assets serve a double function. First, they are claims to future con-
sumption, as is standard in ﬁnance. Second, they serve as media of exchange, as is standard in
monetary theory. It is precisely this second function that captures the notion of asset liquidity.
Assuming that agents incur a per-unit cost to trade foreign claims, we characterize equilib-
ria in which different assets arise as media of exchange in different types of bilateral meetings.
If agents’ trading opportunities abroad are sufﬁciently frequent, then assets circulate as media
of exchange locally. This means that domestic assets facilitate trade at home and foreign assets
facilitate trade abroad. Hence, one contribution of our paper is to endogenize the commonly-
assumed existence of “currency areas” in international macroeconomics. At the other extreme,
if trading opportunities abroad are scarce, agents use their domestic assets to acquire consump-
tion goods both at home and abroad. Finally, in an intermediate case, either type of equilibrium
described above can arise, depending on other parameters that govern asset returns.
We use our model to address a long-standing puzzle in international ﬁnance as described
in Tesar and Werner (1995) and Lewis (1999): a positive relationship between consumption and
asset home bias coupled with higher turnover rates of foreign over domestic assets. In particu-
lar, developed countries obey three empirical regularities. First, in the average OECD country,
agents’ portfolios are heavily biased toward domestic assets. Second, economies that exhibit
higher asset home bias also consume more goods and services from domestic sources. Third,
turnover rates of foreign assets are signiﬁcantly higher than those of domestic assets.
The model predicts that, as long as trading opportunities abroad are not much more fre-
quent than at home, agents’ portfolios exhibit home bias. Since agents hold larger amounts
of domestic over foreign assets, they have larger claims to domestic over foreign consumption
goods. Hence, our suggested mechanism positively links asset and consumption home bias.
1More importantly, under additional parameter restrictions, foreign assets turn over faster than
domestic assets because, while the former have desirable liquidity properties, they yield lower
future consumption and are undesirable saving tools. In the absence of the liquidity factor,
foreign asset trading costs, which are necessary to generate consumption and asset home bias,
would yield lower turnover of foreign relative to domestic assets. Therefore, the unique aspect
of our model is the ability to capture the three stylized facts simultaneously.
Amadi and Bergin (2008) offer an explanation for the coexistence of asset home bias and a
higher turnover rate of foreign over domestic assets. The authors argue that a portfolio-choice
model with a heterogeneous per-unit trading cost and a homogenous ﬁxed entry cost produces
an environment that is consistent with this stylized fact. While this mechanism may be in part
responsible for the observations in the data, we argue that there is considerable room for an ex-
planation that buildson our liquiditychannel. First, unlike ourframework, AmadiandBergin’s
(2008) model does not link consumption and asset home bias, which is a regularity observed in
the data. Second, our model generates a unique testable prediction that relates bilateral asset
turnover rates to bilateral trade in goods, which is not shared by the alternative framework.
In our model, the rate at which foreign assets turn over is driven by the role that the assets
play in facilitating trade abroad. Hence, an implication of our model is that a given importer
turns over faster the assets of the country from which it imports more. To test this prediction,
we combine bilateral goods trade and asset holding data for the 2002-2007 period with annual
gross ﬂows of foreign assets between the US and each of its OECD trading partners. We ﬁnd
that the correlation between the US import shares by source and the US turnover rate of assets
from the same source ranges between 0.3364 and 0.5466 and it is statistically signiﬁcant. The
result provides direct support for the liquidity mechanism over the alternative.
The notion of liquidity that we employ draws upon the monetary search literature. Within
that spirit, we assume that assets serve as means of payments in markets with imperfect credit.1
However, our mechanism intends to capture the broader notion of assets as facilitators of trade.
For example, sellers may require assets as collateral in order to deliver goods to buyers.2 Alter-
natively, agents may rely on repurchase agreements to acquire goods and services. As Lagos
(2011) points out, contractual details aside, in all of these environments assets effectively act as
media of exchange in that they facilitate trade between sellers and untrustworthy buyers.
The liquidity mechanism that we propose reconciles the three stylized facts discussed ear-
lier. However, in order to remain tractable, the model assumes away the risky nature of equity
returns. Thus, the mechanism is complementary to existing models of aggregate uncertainty
that relate asset and consumption home bias. For example, Heathcote and Perri (2007) use a
standard international business cycle framework and show that, when preferences are biased
1 This is in contrast with the ﬁnance literature, which typically relates the liquidity of an asset to the speed with
which it can be converted into consumption. See for example Dufﬁe, Garleanu, and Pedersen (2005).
2 This notion of liquidity is closely relatedto the concept of pledgeability, which was introducedto the literature
by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Holmstr¨ om and Tirole (1998).
2toward domestic goods, asset home bias arises because endogenous international relative price
ﬂuctuations make domestic stocks a good hedge against non-diversiﬁable labor income risk.
Their model generates a tight link between a country’s degree of openness to trade and level
of asset diversiﬁcation. This positive link is also explored by Collard, Dellas, Diba, and Stock-
man (2009) in an endowment economy with separable utility between traded and non-traded
goods. In their model, an agent’s optimal portfolio includes the entire stock of home ﬁrms that
produce domestic non-traded goods and a fully diversiﬁed portfolio of equities of ﬁrms that
produce tradable goods. The authors show that, if the share of non-traded goods in consump-
tion is large, the model can generate substantial portfolio home bias.
In other related literature, Michaelides (2003) solves for optimal international portfolios in
the presence of liquidity constraints and undiversiﬁable labor income risk. The author shows
that substantial asset home bias can be generated in a buffer stock saving model where agents
face higher costs to invest abroad than at home. Assets, however, play a very different role in
his model relative to ours. In the framework of Michaelides (2003), assets help smooth con-
sumption in the presence of liquidity constraints, while in ours, assets help facilitate bilateral
trade. Finally, Hnatkovska (2010) demonstrates that asset home bias and a high foreign asset
turnover rate can arise in the presence of non-diversiﬁable non-traded consumption risk when
each country specializes in production, preferences exhibit consumption home bias, and asset
markets are incomplete. However, in this setting, domestic asset ﬂows are also high, thus yield-
ing equally high turnover rates of domestic assets.
The present paper is the ﬁrst to deliver higher foreign over domestic asset turnover rates in
a model where foreign asset trading costs naturally link consumption and asset home bias. The
liquidity mechanism that generates these desirable predictions relates closely to the growing
literature that focuses on the liquidity properties of objects other than ﬁat money. Lagos and
Rocheteau (2008) assume that part of the economy’s physical capital can be used as a medium
of exchange along with money. Their goal is to study the issue of over-investment and how
it is affected by inﬂation. Geromichalos, Licari, and Suarez-Lledo (2007) study the coexistence
of money and a real ﬁnancial asset as media of exchange, with special focus on the relation-
ship between asset prices and monetary policy. Lester, Postlewaite, and Wright (2008) take this
framework a step further and endogenize the acceptability (of various media of exchange) deci-
sions of agents. Finally, Lagos (2010) considers a similar framework, enriched with uncertainty,
in order to address the equity premium and risk-free rate puzzles. The present paper, however,
is the ﬁrst to introduce liquidity of assets in a multi-country environment and to explore the
implications of liquidity on the distribution of asset holdings across countries.
Lastly, our paper relates to the literature of money-search models applied to international
frameworks. In their pioneering work, Matsuyama, Kiyotaki, and Matsui (1993) employ a
two-country, two-currency money-search model, with indivisible money and goods, and study
conditions under which the two currencies serve as media of exchange in different countries.
3Wright and Trejos (2001) maintain the assumption of good indivisibility in Matsuyama, Kiy-
otaki, and Matsui (1993), but they endogenize prices using bargaining theory. Head and Shi
(2003) also consider a two-country, two-currency search model and show that the nominal ex-
change rate depends on the stocks and growth rates of the two monies. Finally, Camera and
Winkler (2003) use a search-theoretic model of monetary exchange in order to show that the ab-
sence of well-integrated international goods markets does not necessarily imply a violation of
the law of one price. In this paper, we employ a model with divisible assets and goods. More-
over, by endowing assets, other than ﬁat money, with certain liquidity properties, we bring the
money-search literature closer to questions related to international portfolio diversiﬁcation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the modeling en-
vironment. Section 3 discusses the optimal behavior of agents in the economy. Section 4 char-
acterizes the media of exchange that arise in a symmetric two-country model of international
trade in goods and assets. Section 5 describes the model’s predictions regarding asset and con-
sumption home bias as well as asset turnover rates. Section 6 documents the stylized facts and
provides empirical support for the proposed mechanism. Section 7 discusses the robustness of
the results to different modeling assumptions and extensions. Finally, Section 8 concludes.
2 Physical Environment
Time is discrete with an inﬁnite horizon. Each period consists of two sub-periods. During the
ﬁrst sub-period, trade occurs in decentralized markets (DM henceforth), which we describe in
detail below. In the second sub-period, economic activity takes place in traditional Walrasian or
centralized markets (CM henceforth). There is no aggregate uncertainty. There are two coun-
tries, A and B. Each country has a unit measure of buyers and a measure ξ of sellers who live
forever. The identity of agents (as sellers or buyers) is permanent. During the ﬁrst sub-period,
a distinct DM opens within each country and anonymous bilateral trade takes place. We refer
to these markets as DMi, i = A,B. Without loss of generality, assume that DMA opens ﬁrst.
Sellers from country i are immobile, but buyers are mobile. Therefore, in DMi, sellers who are
citizens of country i meet buyers who could be citizens of either country. During the second
sub-period, all agents are located in their home country.
All agents discount the future between periods (but not sub-periods) at rate β ∈ (0,1). Buy-
ers consume in both sub-periods and supply labor in the second sub-period. Their preferences,
which are independent of their citizenship, are given by U(qA,qB,X,H), where qi is consump-
tion in DMi, i = A,B, and X,H are consumption and labor in the (domestic) CM. Sellers
consume only in the CM and they produce in both the DM and the CM. Sellers’ preferences
are given by V(h,X,H), where the only new variable, h, stands for hours worked in the DM.
4In line with Lagos and Wright (2005), we adopt the functional forms
U(qA,qB,X,H) = u(qA) + u(qB) + U(X) − H,
V(h,X,H) = −c(h) + U(X) − H.
We assume that u and U are twice continuously differentiable with u(0) = 0, u′ > 0, u′(0) = ∞,
U′ > 0, u′′ < 0, and U′′ ≤ 0. For simplicity, we set c(h) = h, but this is not crucial for any of our
results. Let q∗ ≡ {q : u′(q∗) = 1}, i.e. q∗ denotes the optimal level of production in any bilateral
meeting. Also, suppose that there exists X∗ ∈ (0,∞) such that U′(X∗) = 1, with U(X∗) > X∗.
During the round of decentralized trade, sellers and buyers are matched randomly accord-
ing to a matching technology that is identical in both DM’s. Let B,S denote the total number
of buyers and sellers in a certain DM.3 The total number of matches in this market is given
by M(B,S) ≤ min{B,S}, where M is increasing in both arguments. Since only the aggregate
measure of buyers (as opposed to the individual measures of local and foreign buyers) appears
in M, the matching technology is unbiased with respect to the citizenship of the buyer. The
arrival rate of buyers to an arbitrary seller is aS = M(B,S)/S, and the arrival rate of sellers to
an arbitrary buyer is aB = M(B,S)/B. In both DM’s, S = ξ. Buyers get to visit the domestic
DM with probability σH ∈ (0,1) and the foreign DM with probability σF ∈ (0,1), so that in
both DM’s B = σH + σF. The relative magnitude of σF to σH captures the degree of economic
integration. In any bilateral meeting, the buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the seller.
Any sale to a citizen of country j will count as imports of country j from country i.
As mentioned earlier, during the second sub-period agents trade in centralized markets,
CMi, i = A,B. All agents consume and produce a general good or fruit which is identical in
both countries. Thus, the domestic and the foreign general goods enter as perfect substitutes
in the utility function. Agents are located in the home country and have access to a technology
that can transform one unit of labor into one unit of the fruit. Furthermore, we assume that
there are two trees, one in each country, that produce fruit, as in Lucas (1978). Shares of the tree
in country i are traded in CMi, but due to perfect ﬁnancial integration, agents from country j
can place any order and buy shares of this tree at the ongoing price ψi. Let Ti > 0 denote the
total supply of the tree in country i and di the per-period dividend of tree i. Since in this paper
we focus on symmetric equilibria, we assume that TA = TB = T > 0 and dA = dB = d > 0. T
and d are exogenously given and constant.
Except from consuming the general good and trading shares of the trees in the CM’s, buyers
can also carry some claims into the DM’s in order to trade them for a special good produced
by local sellers. Hence, assets serve not only as stores of value, but also as media of exchange.
The necessity for a medium of exchange arises due to anonymity and a double coincidence of
3 To avoid the possibility of confusion, variables indexed by the term B are relatedto “country B”. On the other
hand, variables indexed by the term B are related to “Buyers”.
5wants problem that characterizes trade in the DM’s (see Kocherlakota (1998) for an extensive
discussion). Assets can serve as media of exchange as long as they are portable, storable, divis-
ible, and recognizable by all agents. We assume that all these properties are satisﬁed. As we
explain in more detail below, we do not place any ad hoc restrictions on which assets can serve
where as means of payments.
In theabsence ofanyfrictions in thephysical environment, dueto thesymmetry assumption
made earlier, the model would predict that agents’ share of foreign assets in their portfolios is
anywhere between 0 and 100%. In order to derive sharper predictions, additional assumptions
are necessary. One friction that is very common in the international macroeconomics literature
is the so-called currency areas assumption, which dictates that trading in country i requires the
use of that country’s currency (in our case the asset) as a medium of exchange. This assump-
tion isextremely appealingandempiricallyrelevant. However, since our paperisin thespirit of
modern monetary theory, we consider such a restriction undesirable, and we insist that agents
should choose which assets to use as media of exchange.
We now introduce the main friction of our model. We assume that whenever an agent from
country i holds one share of country j’s tree, j  = i, she has a claim to d − κ units of fruit, with
κ ∈ (0,d). We label κ with the general term transaction cost. One can think of κ as an informa-
tion friction or a cost that agents have to pay in order to participate in the foreign asset market.4
Alternatively, κ may capture a policy friction, such as a tax on foreign dividend returns, which
is commonly observed across many countries. Another way to think about κ follows from a
more literal interpretation of the Lucas tree model: when an agent from country i holds one
share of tree j, d units of fruit (general good) have to be physically delivered from country j to
its claimant in country i. Therefore, κ could also represent a transportation cost. It is important
to highlight that all the results presented in this paper hold for arbitrarily small values of κ.
3 Value Functions and Optimal Behavior
We begin with the description of the value functions in the CM. For a buyer from country
i = A,B, the Bellman’s equation is given by
W
B
i (t) = max
X,H,ˆ t
 




s.t. X + ψi
 




ˆ tji + ˆ tjj
 
= H + (ψi + d)(tii + tij) + (ψj + dκ)(tji + tjj).
4 Similarly, Michaelides (2003) assumes that agents face a higher transaction cost when investing abroad.
6The state variables are summarized by t ≡ (tii,tij,tji,tjj), where tij is the amount of asset i that
is used for trade in DMj, and variables with hats denote next period’s choices.5 We have also
deﬁned dκ = d − κ. It can be easily veriﬁed that, at the optimum, X = X∗. Using this fact and
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Two observations are in order. First, since U is quasi-linear, the optimal choice of ˆ t does not
depend on t, i.e. there are no wealth effects. Second, W B
i is linear, and we can write
W
B
i (t) = Λ
B
i + (ψi + d)(tii + tij) + (ψj + dκ)(tji + tjj),
where the deﬁnition of ΛB
i is obvious.
We now focus on sellers. As it is standard in monetary models, carrying assets across peri-
ods of time comes at a cost (in the case of ﬁat money, the cost is just the nominal interest rate).
The only agents who are willing to incur this cost are the agents who beneﬁt from the asset’s
liquidity, i.e. the buyers. Since in our model the identity of agents, as buyers or sellers, is ﬁxed,
sellers will always choose to leave the CM with zero asset holdings. For a more detailed proof
of this result, see Rocheteau and Wright (2005).6 Noting that sellers also choose X = X∗ in
every period, we can write the value function of a seller from country i = A,B as
W
S
i (ti,tj) = U(X
∗) − X





i + (ψi + d)ti + (ψj + dκ)tj.
Like in the buyers’ case, W S
i is linear. Sellers leave the CM with zero asset holdings, but they
might enter this market with positive amounts of both assets, which they received as means of
payments in the preceding DM.
We now turn to the terms of trade in the DM’s. As explained earlier, we place no restrictions
on which assetscan beused asmediaofexchange. Considermeetingsin DMi, andasaﬁrst case
5 Hence, the buyer can bring any amount of local or foreign asset to the local DM, and the same is true for the
foreign DM. This modeling choice guarantees that the order in which the DM’s open is inessential. If the buyer
was choosing some (ˆ ti,ˆ tj), which she could bring to either DM, the amount of assets that she would choose to
trade in, say, DMi would crucially depend on whether she got/will get matched in DMj. That is, the buyer’s
behavior would depend on the order in which the DM’s open. We consider this an undesirable feature.
6 In Rocheteau and Wright (2005), the nominal interest rate is assumed to be strictly positive. Hence, holding
no money is the unique optimal choice for sellers. In our model, there will be a case in which the cost of carrying
the home asset is zero (this will never be the case for the foreign asset because of the transaction cost). In this case,
sellers areindifferentbetween holding zeroor some positive amount of the home asset. Nevertheless, holding zero
asset is always optimal. Moreover, if one assumes that there is a cost, c > 0, of participating in the asset markets,
then holding zero assets is the unique optimal choice for the seller, even for a tiny c.
7let the buyer be a citizen of country i (a local) with asset holdings denoted by t. The solution
to the bargaining problem is a list (qi,xii,xji), where qi is the amount of special good, xii is the
amount of asset i, and xji is the amount of asset j that changes hands. With take-it-or-leave-it










s.t. − qi + W
S
i (xii,xji) − W
S
i (0,0) = 0 (2)
and xii ≤ tii,xji ≤ tji.
Exploiting the linearity of the W’s, we can re-write this problem as
max
qi,xii,xji
[u(qi) − (ψi + d)xii − (ψj + dκ)xji]
s.t. qi = (ψi + d)xii + (ψj + dκ)xji
and xii ≤ tii,xji ≤ tji.
The following lemma describes the bargaining solution in detail.
Lemma 1. Deﬁne πi ≡ (ψi + d)tii + (ψj + dκ)tji.




(ψi + d)xii + (ψj + dκ)xji = q∗.




xii = tii, xji = tji.
Proof. It can be easily veriﬁed that the suggested solution satisﬁes the necessary and sufﬁcient
conditions for maximization.
All that matters for the bargaining solution is whether the buyer’s asset balances, i.e. πi, are
sufﬁcient to buy the optimal quantity q∗. If the answer to that question is yes, then qi = q∗, and
the buyer spends amounts of assets tii,tji such that πi = q∗. Notice that in this case tii,tji cannot
be pinned down separately.7 Conversely, if πi < q∗, the buyer gives up all her asset holdings
and purchases as much q as her balances allow.
Now consider a meeting in DMi when the buyer is from j  = i (a foreigner) with asset
holdings t. Again, denote the solution by (qi,xii,xji). The bargaining problem to be solved is
the same as in (2), after replacing W B
i with W B
j . Using the linearity of the value functions, one
can write the bargaining problem as
7 This does not cause any indeterminacy issues because, as we show later, buyers set tji = 0.
8max
qi,xii,xji
[u(qi) − (ψi + dκ)xii − (ψj + d)xji]
s.t. qi = (ψi + d)xii + (ψj + dκ)xji
and xii ≤ tii,xji ≤ tji.
Substituting for (ψi + d)xii + (ψj + d)xji from the constraint, we can re-write the objective as
u(qi)−qi −κxji +κxii. Notice that for every unit of asset i that goes from the buyer to the seller,
two positive effects are generated. First, trade is facilitated, i.e. the seller produces q for the
buyer in exchange for the asset. Second, the social surplus increases because the asset goes to
the hands of the agent who has a higher valuation for it. The next Lemma describes the solution
to the bargaining problem in detail.
Lemma 2. Deﬁne q(ψ) ≡
 










, with q(ψ) > q∗ >
q(ψ), for all ψ < ∞. The bargaining solution is the following






















qi = tii(ψi + d),
xii = tii,
xj = 0.
c1) If tii <
q(ψj)









c2) If tii <
q(ψj)







Proof. See Appendix A.
The solution is very intuitive. The buyer, citizen of j, should use only asset i whenever pos-
sible. If her asset-i holdings are unlimited, she should buy the quantity deﬁned as q(ψ). This
quantity is larger than q∗, the maximizer of u(q) − q, because of the second positive effect of
using asset i described above (the wedge between the buyer’s and the seller’s valuation). In
similar spirit, if the buyer’s balances allow her to buy q(ψ) or more, she should not use any
amount of asset j for trade. Positive amounts of asset j will change hands, only if the asset-
i holdings are such that the buyer cannot purchase q(ψ). In that case, the buyer will use the
9amount of asset j that, together with all of her asset-i holdings, buys the quantity q(ψ).
Our last task in this section is to discuss the optimal portfolio choice of the buyer. To that
end, we ﬁrst describe the buyer’s value function in the DM. Once this function has been estab-
lished, we can plug it into equation (1) and characterize this agent’s objective function. Deﬁne
pH ≡ aBσH and pF ≡ aBσF, i.e. pH is the probability of matching in the local DM, and pF is the
analogous expression for the foreign DM. Then, the value function for a buyer from country i
who enters the round of decentralized trade with asset holdings t = (tii,tij,tji,tjj), is given by
V
B
i (t) = pHpF
 
u(qi) + u(qj) + W
B
i (tii − xii,tij − xij,tji − xji,tjj − xjj)
 




i (tii − xii,tij,tji − xji,tjj)
 




i (tii,tij − xij,tji,tjj − xjj)
 
+ (1 − pH)(1 − pF)W
B
i (t), (3)
where q,x are determined by the bargaining protocols described in Lemmata 1 and 2. It is
understood that (qi,xii,xji) are functions of (tii,tji) and (qj,xij,xjj) are functions of (tij,tjj).
The next step is to lead eqution (3) by one period in order to obtain V B
i (ˆ t). Then, plug the
latter into (1) and focus only on the terms that contain the control variables ˆ t = (ˆ tii,ˆ tij,ˆ tji,ˆ tjj).
This is the objective function of the buyer from country i, and it can be written as
J
B
i (ˆ t) = J
B
i,H(ˆ tii,ˆ tji) + J
B
i,F(ˆ tij,ˆ tjj), (4)
where we have deﬁned
J
B















u(qi(ˆ tii,ˆ tji)) −
 
ˆ ψi + d
 
xii(ˆ tii,ˆ tji) −
 






















u(qj(ˆ tij,ˆ tjj)) −
 
ˆ ψi + d
 
xij(ˆ tij,ˆ tjj) −
 






i,n is the part of the objective that reﬂects the choice of assets to be traded in DMn,
with n = H for home or n = F for foreign.
Equation (4) highlights that the optimal choice of asset holdings to be traded in the home
and foreign DM ((ˆ tii,ˆ tji) and (ˆ tij,ˆ tjj), respectively) can be studied in isolation. The term −ψi +
β( ˆ ψi +d) represents the net gain from carrying one unit of the domestic asset from today’s CM
into tomorrow’s CM. Sometimes we refer to the negative of this term as the cost of carrying the
asset across periods. Similarly, −ψj +β(ˆ ψj+dκ) is the net gain from carrying one unit of the for-
eign asset across consecutive CM’s. In both (5) and (6), the second line represents the expected
10(discounted) surplus of the buyer in each DM. The following Lemma states an important result
regarding the sign of the cost terms that appear in the agents’ objective functions.
Lemma 3. In any equilibrium, ψl ≥ β(ˆ ψl + d), l = A,B.
Proof. This is a standard result in monetary theory. If ψl < β(ˆ ψl+d) for some l, agents of country
l have an inﬁnite demand for this asset, and so equilibrium is not well deﬁned.
According to the Lemma, the net gain from carrying home assets across periods is non-
positive and the net gain from carrying foreign assets across periods is strictly negative due to
the term κ. This result assigns an intuitive interpretation to the objective function established
above: a buyer wishes to bring assets with her in the DM in order to facilitate trade. However,
she faces a trade-off because carrying these assets is not free (equations (5) and (6)).8 We are
now ready to discuss the optimal portfolio choice of the buyer and, consequently, equilibrium.
4 Equilibrium in the Two-Country Model
We begin this section with a general deﬁnition of equilibrium and we explain why focusing on
symmetric, steady-state equilibria can make the analysis more tractable.
Deﬁnition 1. An equilibrium for the two-country economy is a list of solutions to the bargain-
ing problems in DMi, i = A,B described by Lemmata 1 and 2 and bounded paths of ψA,ψB,











Bl. The term ti
jl denotes demand
of a buyer from country i for asset j to trade in DMl.
In the remainder of the paper we focus on symmetric, steady-state equilibria. In our model,
pH,pF are the same in both countries. This fact, in combination with the strict concavity of
JB
i,H and JB
i,F (which is standard in the Lagos-Wright model), implies the following: each buyer
has a certain (degenerate) demand for the home asset and a certain (degenerate) demand for









AA.9 Two important implications
follow. First, both assets have equal aggregate supply (T) and aggregate demand. Therefore,
their equilibrium price has to be equal, ψA = ψB = ψ. Second, by the bargaining protocols, the
8 Lemma 3 also clariﬁes our claim that it is always optimal for sellers to hold zero assets. In the case of foreign
assets, this is the unique optimal choice.
9 For example, tA
AA = tB
BB means that the demand for asset A of a buyer from A in order to trade in her local
DM is equal to the demand of a buyer from B for asset B used for trade in her local DM. The remaining equations
admit similar interpretations.
11amount of special good that changes hands in any DM depends only on whether the buyer is a
local or a foreigner, but not on the label of the DM. These facts lead to the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 2. A symmetric, steady-state equilibrium for the two-country economy can be sum-
marized by the objects {tHH,tHF,tFH,tFF,qH,qF,ψ}. The term tij is the equilibrium asset hold-
ings of the representative buyer (of any country) for asset i to be used for trade in DMj, with
i,j = H for home or i,j = F for foreign. For future reference also deﬁne the total home and
foreign asset holdings of buyers, tH = tHH + tHF and tF = tFH + tFF. The term qi stands for
the amount of special good that changes hands in any DM when the buyer is local (i = H) or
foreign (i = F). Finally, ψ is the symmetric, steady-state equilibrium asset price. Equilibrium
objects are such that agents maximize their respective objective functions and markets clear.
We now proceed to a more careful discussion of the optimal portfolio choice of buyers and,
consequently, equilibrium. Notice that the symmetric, steady-state version of Lemma 3 dictates
that ψ ≥ βd/(1 − β) ≡ ψ∗. The term ψ∗ is the so-called fundamental value of the asset, i.e.
the unique price that agents would be willing to pay for one unit of this asset if we were to
shut down the DM’s (in which case the model would coincide with a two-country Lucas-tree
model). We will examine the choice of (tHH,tFH) and (tHF,tFF) separately, by looking at the
symmetric, steady-state versions of (5) and (6).
Lemma 4. A buyer’s optimal choice of asset holdings for trade in the local DM satisﬁes tFH = 0.
Moreover, if ψ > ψ∗, tHH solves
ψ = β(ψ + d){1 + pH[u
′ ((ψ + d)tHH) − 1]}, (7)
and if ψ = ψ∗, tHH ≥ q∗/(ψ + d).
Proof. See Appendix A.
Lemma 4 reveals that buyers never carry foreign assets to trade in the local DM. The intu-
ition behind this result is straightforward. Recall from Lemma 1 that any combination of assets
for which (ψ+d)tHH +(ψ+dκ)tFH = π, for some given π, buys the same amount of special good.
Since the foreign asset has a higher holding cost, it is always optimal for the buyer to purchase
any desired quantity using tHH only. When the cost to carry assets falls to zero, optimality re-
quires that the buyer bring any amount of assets that buy her q∗ in the local DM (this amount
maximizes the buyer’s surplus). By Lemma 1, any tHH ≥ (1 − β)q∗/d does that job.
Next, we consider the optimal choice of assets used for trade in the foreign DM. There are
three scenarios (or regimes), that depend on the values of the following parameters: β,pF, and
κ/d. In the ﬁrst scenario, regardless of asset prices, the agent uses only foreign assets to trade
in the foreign DM. In the second scenario, again regardless of asset prices, the agent chooses
12tFF = 0 and trades in the foreign DM with her home asset. Finally, there is a third regime, in
which the agent uses either tHF or tFF as means of payment (except from a knife-edge case),
depending on asset prices. The following Lemma describes the details. Figure 1 summarizes
the parameter values that constitute the various regions described in Lemma 5.
Lemma 5. Case 1: Assume (pF,β) ∈ R1, or (pF,β) ∈ R2 and κ
d >
(1−2pF )
(1−pF )(1−β) ≡ ˜ κ. Then the buyer
uses only the foreign asset as a medium of exchange in the foreign DM. The optimal tFF satisﬁes
ψ = β [(1 − pF)(ψ + dκ) + pF(ψ + d)u
′((ψ + d)tFF))]. (8)
If ψ > ψ∗, then tHF = 0, and if ψ = ψ∗, then tHF ∈ R+. Also, qF = (ψ + d)tFF.
Case 2: Assume (pF,β) ∈ R4. The buyer sets tFF = 0 and uses only the domestic asset as a medium
of exchange in the foreign DM. If ψ > ψ∗, then tHF satisﬁes
ψ = β [(1 − pF)(ψ + d) + pF(ψ + dκ)u
′((ψ + dκ)tHF)], (9)
with qF = (ψ + dκ)tHF. If ψ = ψ∗, then any tHF ≥ q(ψ∗)/(d/(1 − β) − κ) is optimal. In this case,
qF = q(ψ∗).
Case 3: Assume (pF,β) ∈ R3, or (pF,β) ∈ R2 and κ/d ≤ ˜ κ. Also, deﬁne ψc ≡ β(1 − pF)(2d −
κ)/[1 − 2β(1 − pF)]. The following sub-cases arise: a) If ψ > ψc, then the optimal tHF,tFF,qF are as in
Case 1 above. b) If ψ < ψc, then the optimal tHF,tFF,qF are as in Case 2 above. c) In the knife-edge case
ψ = ψc, tHF,tFF > 0 and both (8) and (9) hold. The optimal choices tHF,tFF cannot be uniquely pinned
down, but qF is uniquely given by qF,c ≡ {q : u′(q) = (1 − pF)/pF}.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Lemma 5 has an intuitive explanation. The term κ creates a “wedge” between the asset
valuations of a seller and a buyer who come from different countries. The buyer knows that if
she meets with a foreign seller, she will have higher purchasing power if she carries the foreign
asset (which represents a home asset to the seller). On the other hand, meeting the seller is
not guaranteed, and if the buyer stays unmatched in the foreign DM, she will receive the lower
dividend associated with the foreign asset. A reverse story appliesregarding the optimal choice
of tHF. If the buyer carries a large amount of the home asset and matches in the foreign DM, she
will have lower purchasing power because, for every unit of tHF that she passes to the seller,
the latter will receive a lower dividend in the forthcoming CM. Not surprisingly, when pF is
high, the buyer decides to carry out trades in the foreign DM using the foreign asset. On the
other hand, when it is less likely to match abroad (low pF), the buyer prefers to carry her home
asset, even when trading in the foreign country. In intermediate cases, either regime can arise,
depending on the asset price, which affects the holding costs.10













Figure 1: Parameter Values and Regions
The relationship between the optimal tHF and tFF with pF is straightforward. What is per-
haps more surprising is the fact that, in R2, the buyer chooses to trade with the foreign asset
when κ is relatively high. This might seem counterintuitive at ﬁrst, given that a high κ means
a low dividend for a buyer who did not dispose of the foreign asset. But one should not forget
that a high κ also implies low purchasing power for the buyer, if she carries only tHF. These
forces have opposing effects. Whether it is optimal to trade with tHF or tFF depends on the
value of β. When κ is high, the buyer realizes that she might receive a lower dividend, but this
will happen tomorrow. On the other hand, when the buyer is trying to buy some q and pay with
tHF, the seller will receive a lower dividend in the current period’s CM, i.e. tonight. Thus, a
high κ dictates the use of tFF in foreign meetings, as long as agents are not very patient. As
an extreme case, consider points in R2 that are close to the origin, and suppose κ is very high.
Although pF is tiny, the buyer chooses to trade with tFF because, in this region, β is also tiny.
So far we have analyzed the optimal behavior of agents for given (symmetric, steady state)
asset prices. To complete the model, we incorporate the exogenous supply of assets in the
analysis and treat ψ as an equilibrium object. For the reader’s convenience, before we state the
proposition that characterizes equilibrium, we repeat the deﬁnitions of some objects introduced
above, and we deﬁne a few new objects.11
optimal choice transforms fully. For ψ = ψc − ǫ, ǫ > 0, tFF = 0 and tHF > 0. But for ψ = ψc + ǫ, tHF = 0 and
the agent uses only foreign assets as a medium of exchange. Despite this dramatic change in the agent’s portfolio
composition, as ψ crosses the critical value ψc, the amount of special good purchased is continuous in ψ. To see
this point, just set ψ = ψc + ǫ in (8) and ψ = ψc − ǫ in (9). It is easy to show that, as ǫ → 0, qF → qF,c in both cases.
11 A comment on notation: when we write q∗
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Proposition 1. For all parameter values, in equilibrium, tFH = 0. Moreover:
a) If (pF,β) ∈ R1, or (pF,β) ∈ R2 and κ/d ≥ ˜ κ, equilibrium is characterized by “local asset
dominance” and agents trade in the foreign DM using only foreign assets. Hence, tHF = 0, tH = tHH,
and tF = tFF. If T ≥ T ∗
1, then ψ = ψ∗, qH = q∗, qF = q∗
F,1 < q∗, and tH = T − q∗
F,1(1 − β)/d. If
T < T ∗
1, then ψ > ψ∗, qH < q∗, and qF < q∗
F,1. For any T in this region, ∂ψ/∂T < 0, ∂qH/∂T > 0, and
∂qF/∂T > 0.
b) If (β,pF) ∈ R4, an “international asset” equilibrium arises and agents use their home assets in all
DM’s, i.e. tFF = 0, so tF = 0 and tH = T. If T ≥ T ∗
2, then ψ = ψ∗, qH = q∗, and qF = q(ψ∗) < q∗. If
T < T ∗
2, then ψ > ψ∗, qH < q∗, and qF < q(ψ∗). For any T in this region, ∂ψ/∂T < 0, ∂qH/∂T > 0,
and ∂qF/∂T > 0.
c) If (β,pF) ∈ R3, or (β,pF) ∈ R2 and κ/d < ˜ κ, a “mixed regime” equilibrium arises in the sense
that either local asset dominance or international asset could arise depending on T. If T > Tc, we are in
the international asset regime. For T’s in this region, ψ ∈ [ψ∗,ψc), qH ∈ (qH,c,q∗], and qF ∈ (qF,c,q∗
F,2].
If T < Tc, we switch to a local asset dominance equilibrium and ψ > ψc, qH < qH,c, and qF < qF,c. In
the knife-edge case where T = Tc, buyers purchase qF = qF,c in the foreign DM using any combination
of home and foreign assets.
Proof. See Appendix A.
can reach and the number 1 refers to the case, in particular Case 1.
15A unique steady state equilibrium exists for all parameter values. Buyers never carry for-
eign assets in order to trade in their home DM. Under parameter values summarized as Case
1 in Lemma 5, an equilibrium with local asset dominance arises. Buyers choose to trade in the
foreign DM using the foreign asset only, because the positive effect (high purchasing power) of
holding foreign assets dominates the negative effect (low dividend). There exists a critical level
T ∗
1 that captures the liquidity needs of the economy. For T < T ∗
1, increasing T helps buyers pur-
chase more special good in both DM’s. Hence, the marginal valuation of one unit of the claim
is higher than ψ∗, i.e. the price of the asset in a world where the Lucas-tree serves only as a
store of value. The difference ψ−ψ∗ represents a liquidity premium because it reﬂects a premium
in the valuation of the asset that stems from its second role (as a medium of exchange). When
T ≥ T ∗
1, the asset’s liquidity properties have been exploited (increasing T does not help buyers
purchase more good) and ψ = ψ∗. When this is true, the cost of carrying the home asset is zero,
so local buyers absorb all the excess supply, tH = T − q∗
F,1(1 − β)/d.
A similar analysis applies when parameter values are as in Case 2 in Lemma 5. We refer
to this case as an international asset equilibrium because agents use their home asset as means
of payment everywhere in the world. The asset supply that captures the liquidity needs of the
economy is given by T ∗
2. When T ≥ T ∗
2, the asset price is down to its fundamental value and
qH,qF have reached their upper bounds. Notice that in this case, buyers do not purchase any
foreign assets in the CM, i.e. tF = 0 and tH = T. However, this does not mean that no agent
ever holds any foreign assets. Sellers from country i who got matched with foreign buyers get
payed with, and therefore hold some, asset j (which represents a home asset to the buyers).
This will be important in the next section where we will compute asset home bias.
When parameter values are as in Case 3 in Lemma 5, we can end up with local asset dom-
inance or international asset equilibrium depending on T, which directly affects ψ. Equilibria
with local asset dominance arise if and only if T > Tc. When T is large, equilibrium prices
are relatively low, which means that the cost of carrying the asset is relatively low. When the
cost of carrying assets is low, the term κ becomes relatively more important. Recall from the
discussion of Lemma 5 that it is precisely when κ is relatively high that agents choose to use the
foreign asset in order to trade in the foreign DM (this becomes obvious when (β,pF) ∈ R2). On
the other hand, if T is very small, the cost of carrying assets is large, so the term κ becomes less
relevant. For intermediate values of (β,pF) (remember we are in Case 3), this leads the buyers
to optimally choose their home asset to trade in all DM’s.
5 Home Bias and High Turnover
In this section we derive three predictions of our model. These include the existence of asset
home bias, the positive correlation between asset and consumption home bias, and the higher
16turnover rate of foreign over domestic assets. We focus on the local asset dominance equilib-
rium, which is empirically relevant as it corresponds to a currency area. We treat the case of
international asset equilibrium in the accompanying Online Appendix.
5.1 Preliminaries
In this section we establish some useful properties of the equilibrium values of qH,qF and tH,tF,
which will lead us to our discussion of asset and consumption home bias as well as asset
turnover rates. For given ψ, the ﬁrst-order conditions (7) and (8) implicitly deﬁne qH,qF as
functions of the probabilities pH,pF. We have
qH = qH(pH) ≡
 
q : u
′(q) = 1 +












The produced quantities can be used to characterize the volumes of assets that change hands in









Lemma 6. a) If T < T ∗
1, the following results hold: i) The functions qH(pH), qF(pF) and tH(pH), tF(pF)
are strictly increasing. ii) For every pH = pF = p ∈ (0,1), qH(p) > qF(p). iii) For any pF ∈ (0,1),
deﬁne ˜ pH(pF) ≡ {p : qH(p) = qF(pF)}. Then, ˜ pH(pF) < pF, and for any pF ∈ (0,1), pH > ˜ pH(pF)
implies qH(pH) > qF(pF). iv) For any pF ∈ (0,1), pH > ˜ pH(pF) implies tH(pH) > tF(pF).
b) If T ≥ T ∗
1, qH = q∗ > q∗
F,1 = qF. Also, tH = T − q∗
F,1(1 − β)/d > q∗
F,1(1 − β)/d = tF.
Proof. See Appendix A.
When the economy is liquidity constrained, i.e. T < T ∗
1, the equilibrium quantity of special
good purchased in a certain DM, and the volume of the traded asset, are increasing in the
probability of visiting that DM. Since, qH(p) is strictly larger than qF(p), for all p ∈ (0,1), agents
purchase greater amounts of the home special good, even when the probability of trading in the
local DM is smaller than the probability of trading in the foreign DM (but not much smaller).
Moreover, since trade in a certain DM is facilitated by the local asset, the condition which
guarantees that qH > qF (namely pH > ˜ pH(pF)), will also guarantee that tH > tF. On the other
hand, if T ≥ T ∗
1, we have qH > qF and tH > tF, regardless of pH,pF.
175.2 Asset Home Bias
In this section, we derive sufﬁcient conditions under which the model’s predicted asset portfo-
lio is biased toward domestic assets. The result is summarized in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2. a) Assume that T < T ∗
1. For any pF ∈ (0,1), let pH > ˜ pH(pF). Then agents’ portfolios
exhibit home bias in the sense that the home asset share in the entire portfolio is greater than ﬁfty percent.





b) Assume that T ≥ T ∗















Proof. See Appendix A.
The details of the derivation of the asset home bias formula can be found in Appendix B. To
understand why the left-hand side of (10) represents the home asset share in the agents’ portfo-
lio, focus on the citizens of a certain country. In the denominator, T stands for the citizens’ total
asset holdings. It is multiplied by two because we account for asset holdings in both the DM
and the CM (we assume equal weight). The numerator represents the home asset holdings.
The term 2tH stands for the buyers’ asset holdings in the CM and in the DM. The term pFtF is
the amount of the home asset held by sellers who matched with foreign buyers. The formula in
(11) admits a similar interpretation.
To understand the result, ﬁrst consider the case in which T < T ∗
1. Then, portfolios exhibit
home bias as long as trading opportunities at home are not signiﬁcantly less abundant than
trading opportunities abroad. This follows directly from Lemma 6. Intuitively, when the econ-
omy is liquidity constrained, agents incur positive costs to hold the domestic and the foreign
asset. Hence, they choose the optimal mix of assets in anticipation of their purchasing needs for
special goods, which are governed by the trading opportunities. The higher the probability for
a successful match in a market, the higher the demand for the asset that facilitates trade there.
When T ≥ T ∗
1, agents purchase the quantities q∗ and q∗
F,1. The term q∗ is independent of the
matching probabilities, while q∗
F,1 is rising in pF but never exceeds q∗. Hence, for the purpose of
acquiring special goods, the demand for foreign assets cannot exceed the demand for domestic
assets. Moreover, as soon as the liquidity needs of the economy are satisﬁed, asset prices fall
to fundamental values. Then, domestic assets become useful saving tools, while foreign assets
18remain costly to hold. Hence, agents hold the domestic asset both as a saving tool and in or-
der to engage in trade at home, while they only acquire enough foreign assets to satisfy their
purchasing needs abroad.
5.3 Consumption and Asset Home Bias
In this model, consumption and asset home bias coexist. Proposition 3 states the result.
Proposition 3. Deﬁne CF, CT, and CH as the value of foreign (or imported) consumption, total con-
sumption, and consumption produced at home, respectively.
a) Assume T < T ∗
1. For any pF ∈ (0,1), let pH > ˜ pH(pF). Then CH > CF, implying
CH
CT > 0.5.
b) Assume T ≥ T ∗
1. For any pH,pF, we have
CH
CT > 0.5.
Proof. See Appendix B.
The details of the accounting of consumption can be found in Appendix B. For each agent in
the model, imported consumption consists of special goods bought from foreign sellers as well
as fruit obtained from abroad when net claims to foreign trees are positive. On the contrary, do-
mestic consumption includes special goods bought in domestic DM meetings as well as fruit
obtained not only when net claims to the domestic tree are positive, but also via work.
Then, the results follow from Proposition 2 and Lemma 6. Suppose that the parameters are
restricted such that the economy exhibits asset home bias. Since, at the country level, more do-
mestic assets are held relative to foreign ones, net aggregate claims to foreign trees fall short of
net claims to domestic trees. With respect to the DM, Lemma 6 ensures that the quantity (and
value) exchanged (and consumed) in a domestic meeting exceeds the quantity (and value) ex-
changed in a foreign meeting. Thus, for any non-negative work effort, domestic consumption
exceeds imported consumption. Finally, Lemma 6 and Proposition 3 suggest that agents buy
more consumption goods from countries whose assets they hold in higher amounts. Thus, the
model yields the following testable prediction: bilateral imports are positively correlated with
bilateral asset positions.
The above discussion demonstrates that consumption and asset home bias are intimately
related in the model. When the economy is liquidity constrained, asset and consumption home
bias arise as long as trading opportunities at home are not signiﬁcantly less abundant than
trading opportunities abroad. The latter occurs if the probability with which agents visit the
domestic relative to the foreign market is higher. It is reasonable to argue that such parameter
restriction would hold ifagents have a stronger preference for domestic goods, experience more
frequent positive shocks to domestic consumption, or simplypossess superior information over
the quality of domestic goods. These assumptions are standard in the home bias literature (see
19Heathcote andPerri (2007), Collard, Dellas, Diba, andStockman (2009)andHnatkovska (2010)).
However, when the liquidity needs of the economy are satisﬁed, consumption and asset
home bias coexist regardless of the relative trading opportunities in domestic and foreign mar-
kets. The key insight from this case is that domestic assets are useful saving tools, while foreign
assets are not due to the existence of transaction costs. Hence, agents hold the domestic asset
both as a saving tool and in order to engage in trade at home, while they only acquire enough
foreign assets to satisfy their purchasing needs abroad. This very mechanism lies at the heart
of the model’s ability to reconcile the coexistence of asset and consumption home bias with a
higher turnover rate of foreign over domestic assets.
5.4 Domestic and Foreign Asset Turnover Rates
The model’s predictions on asset and consumption home bias discussed above are shared with
the frameworks of Heathcote and Perri (2007), Collard, Dellas, Diba, and Stockman (2009), and
Hnatkovska (2010). However, the additional prediction that relates domestic and foreign asset
turnover rates discussed below is unique to the present model.
































There exists a level of asset supply ˜ T, with T ∗
1 ≤ ˜ T < ∞, such that T ≥ ˜ T implies TRF > TRH.
Since the derivations of turnover rates are essential forthe understanding ofthe Proposition,
we present the proof in the main text.
Proof of Proposition 4. Following Warnock (2002), we deﬁne the foreign turnover rate as the ratio
of the total volume of the foreign asset traded by the citizens of the domestic country (numer-
ator) over the total volume of the foreign asset held by the citizens of the domestic country
(denominator).12 For theoretical consistency, we deﬁne the domestic turnover rate as the ratio
of the total volume of the domestic asset traded by the citizens of the domestic country over the
total volume of the domestic asset held by the citizens of the domestic country. We continue to
12 Warnock’s (2002) deﬁnition uses values rather than volumes, but the two are identical in the steady state.
20count asset holdings in both the CM and the DM, assuming equal weights for the two markets.
It is understood that we count asset holdings at the end of each subperiod.
a) Suppose T < T ∗
1. TRF is given by (14). The numerator reﬂects all the trades of the foreign
asset carried out by the citizens of the domestic country.13 A measure pF of buyers match in
the foreign DM and exchange tF units of the foreign asset to acquire the special good. They
also purchase tF units of the foreign asset in the CM in order to re-balance their portfolios. The
denominator consists of the total holdings of the foreign asset, which amount to (2−pF)tF. This
expression includes the holdings of buyers in both the CM and the DM, 2tF, net of the amount
given up by buyers of measure pF who matched abroad. Since the term tF appears in both the
numerator and the denominator, it cancels out, yielding the constant turnover rate in (14).
TRH is given by (12). The numerator includes the amount of domestic assets that buyers
buy, pHtH, and sellers sell, pHtH + pFtF, in order to re-balance their portfolios in the CM after
successfully matching in the DM. In addition, the numerator reﬂects the amount of domes-
tic assets exchanged in the DM between sellers and domestic and foreign buyers, respectively,
pHtH + pFtF. The denominator corresponds to total domestic assets held, which can be found
in the numerator of the home-asset share expression in (10).
b) Suppose T ≥ T ∗
1. Clearly, TRF is still given by (14), but TRH differs. The logic of the
calculations is identical. The main difference lies in the denominator. When T ≥ T ∗
1, not all
domestic asset holdings are used as media of exchange in the DM because they have desirable
saving properties. Following the same strategy as above and substituting asset holdings with
the corresponding quantities of special goods exchanged in the DM obtains (13). TRF is con-
stant, so it is unaffected by the asset supply. However, TRH is decreasing in T, for all T, and
TRH → 0 as T → ∞. Therefore, there exists ˜ T, with T ∗
1 ≤ ˜ T < ∞, such that T ≥ ˜ T necessarily
implies TRF > TRH.
As in Propositions 2 and 3, there are two distinct cases to consider. If T < T ∗
1, the domestic
and foreign turnover rates are given by (12) and (14), respectively. However, unlike the home
asset and consumption shares, the domestic turnover rate is not monotone in the trading prob-
ability at home. Hence, an unambiguous ranking between domestic and foreign turnover rates
cannot be made in this case.
In contrast, when T exceeds T ∗
1, agents purchase the quantities q∗ and q∗
F,1, so increases in T
have no effect on the quantities of special goods bought. Instead, increases in the asset supply
raise the agents’ domestic asset holdings, but have no effect on the amounts of domestic assets
that change hands during a period, leadingto a decrease in the turnover rate of the domestic as-
13 Throughout, we adopt the following accounting procedure: (i) In the DM, we count each transaction only
once, since, by deﬁnition, the meeting is bilateral in the sense that the buyer and the seller trade with each other;
(ii) In the CM, we count both the amount ofassets bought by the buyersand theamount sold by the sellersbecause
the market is Walrasian and, therefore, agents trade against the market and not with each other. In fact, the latter
procedure is applied when accounting for stock-market transactions in the data.
21set. Intuitively, when the liquidity needsof the economy are satisﬁed, domestic assets are useful
saving tools, while foreign assets are not due to the presence of transaction costs. Hence, agents
hold the domestic asset as a saving tool and use it to trade at home, while they only acquire
enough foreign assets to satisfy their purchasing needs abroad. The domestic asset’s desirable
saving property results in a reduction in its turnover rate. On the other hand, agents unload
foreign assets (to foreign sellers) at the ﬁrst given opportunity, which leadsto a relatively higher
turnover rate of the foreign asset. Thus, the mechanism that drives the coexistence of asset and
consumption bias also yields a higher turnover rate of foreign over domestic assets.
5.4.1 Unique Testable Prediction: Asset Turnover and Trade
Inour model, the rateatwhich foreignassetsturn overisdriven bytherole thatthe assetsplayin
facilitating trade abroad. This is apparent in expression (14), where the foreign turnover rate is
an increasing function of the probability to trade abroad, pF. Moreover, Lemma 6 ensures that
the value of imported consumption, as deﬁned in Proposition 3, is increasing in this trading
probability. Hence, a natural implication of our model is that a given importer turns over faster
the assets of the (foreign) country from which it imports more. This prediction is unique to our
model and it will ultimately serve as a test of the liquidity mechanism.
5.4.2 Alternative Deﬁnition of Domestic Turnover Rate
Inthetheoretical analysisabove, weadoptedWarnock’s(2002)deﬁnitionoftheforeign turnover
rate, which is standard in the empirical literature. Given this deﬁnition, we constructed a
theoretically-consistent deﬁnition of the domestic turnover rate. However, since the existing
empirical literature has not considered the liquidity mechanism developed in this paper, it does
not report measures of the theoretically-consistent domestic turnover rate. Instead, Warnock
(2002) deﬁnes domestic turnover as the ratio of annual transactions on a market to its capital-
ization. The market for which estimates are reported is the stock exchange. Consequently, we
re-establish the turnover results using the empirically-relevant deﬁnition of domestic turnover.
In the model, the CM represents the stock exchange. Its market capitalization is simply the
total asset supply T. The transactions that constitute the numerator are all the trades (purchases
and sales) of domestic claims by both domestic and foreign agents. Domestic agents who suc-
cessfully matched in the domestic DM re-balance their portfolios as follows: a measure pH of
buyers buy tH units, and measures pH and pF of sellers sell tH and tF units, respectively. In
addition, a measure pF of foreign buyers who matched in the domestic DM purchase tF units
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∗
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where the second line is obtained by substituting out the asset holdings using the appropriate
formulas for the liquidity-unconstrained case. Once again, the foreign turnover rate in (14) is
constant, so it is unaffected by the asset supply. On the other hand, if T ≥ T ∗
1, TRH is decreasing
in T, and TRH → 0 as T → ∞. Therefore, there exists ˜ ˜ T, with T ∗
1 ≤ ˜ ˜ T < ∞, such that T ≥ ˜ ˜ T
implies TRF > TRH.
In sum, we can provide sufﬁcient conditions such that countries exhibit asset and consump-
tion home bias as well as higher foreign over domestic asset turnover rates.
6 Empirical Analysis
In this section, we document three stylized facts that in unison represent a puzzle for the in-
ternational ﬁnance literature. Throughout the section, we focus our analysis on equities for
comparison to the existing literature and due to data availability.
6.1 Asset Home Bias
In section 5.2, we discussed the ﬁrst prediction of the model: countries’ asset portfolios exhibit
home bias under reasonable parameter restrictions.
Home bias represents an empirical regularity in cross-country data. In their seminal paper,
French and Poterba (1991) document that, in 1989, the ﬁve largest economies held ninety per-
cent of their wealth in domestic equities. Although home bias is not as severe in recent decades,
it does persist in the data. We document this fact using cross-country data on international as-
set and liability positions provided by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) and data on stock market
capitalization from the WDI.
Table 1 shows that, during the 1997-2007 period, the mean domestic asset share among 27
OECDcountrieswas75percent. Tomeasureassethomebias, weemployamethodology similar
to Collard, Dellas, Diba, and Stockman (2009). First, we compute international diversiﬁcation,
Int’l Dvrsf. =
Foreign Portfolio Equity Assets
Stock Mkt Cap + Foreign Portfolio Equity Assets - Foreign Portfolio Equity Liab.
,
23where Foreign Portfolio Equity Asset refers to a less-than-ten-percent share ownership of a ﬁrm
headquartered abroad. Then, we capture asset home bias through the home asset share
HA = 1 − Int’l Dvrsf.
Table 1: Average Home Equity Share of Portfolio, 1997-2007
Country HA Country HA Country HA
Australia 0.8374 Germany 0.5951 Norway 0.5493
Austria 0.4279 Greece 0.9536 Poland 0.9850
Belgium 0.5720 Hungary 0.9450 Portugal 0.7011
Canada 0.7432 Italy 0.6364 Spain 0.8589
Chile 0.8366 Japan 0.8972 Sweden 0.6290
Czech Republic 0.8382 Korea, Republic of 0.9538 Switzerland 0.5659
Denmark 0.6218 Mexico 0.9280 Turkey 0.9772
Finland 0.7206 Netherlands 0.4018 United Kingdom 0.6906
France 0.7523 New Zealand 0.6502 United States 0.8531
OECD Average 0.7452
With this deﬁnition in mind, all but one country in our sample exhibit asset home bias, since
average home asset shares (HA) over the period are in excess of the ﬁfty-percent benchmark
that characterizes a fully-diversiﬁed portfolio in our model.
6.2 Consumption and Asset Home Bias
In section 5.3, we showed that consumption and asset home bias coexist in the model underrea-
sonable parameter restrictions. This prediction is supported by the empirical literature. Heath-
cote and Perri (2007) and Collard, Dellas, Diba, and Stockman (2009) document that more open
economies (in terms of trade as a fraction of GDP) exhibit lower asset home bias.
In section 5.3, we also derived the second prediction of the model: bilateral imports are
positively correlated with bilateral asset positions. To test it, we obtain bilateral equity hold-
ing data from the Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) database provided by the
World Bank. The advantage of the database is that it contains bilateral asset holdings for the set
of OECD countries considered above during the second half of the studied decade, 2002-2007.
The disadvantage is that a number of positive bilateral observations are not made publicly
available for security reasons. Thus, domestic asset shares cannot be computed, since missing
observations will bias home asset shares upward. Consequently, we use the database to simply
test the positive correlation between bilateral imports and asset positions.
To compute bilateral asset holding shares, we combine the CPIS data with stock market
24capitalization data from WDI. Then, we merge these statistics with annual bilateral imports ob-
tained from Stats.Oecd.14 We compute bilateral import shares using GDP data from Stats.Oecd.
Table 2: Bilateral Import and Equity Holding Shares, 2002-2007
year correlation p-value # obs
2002 0.4504 0.0000 570
2003 0.3833 0.0000 584
2004 0.3581 0.0000 602
2005 0.3707 0.0000 593
2006 0.3898 0.0000 617
2007 0.3973 0.0000 614
Note: # obs = # available bilateral equity holding data points
Table 2 shows the cross-country correlation between bilateral equity holding and import
shares for the 2002-2007 period. The correlation ranges between 0.3581 and 0.4504 and it is
highly statistically signiﬁcant. Hence, it is reasonable to conclude that bilateral equity holding
and import shares are positively correlated in the data. These results are supported by the
existing literature. Aviat and Coeurdacier (2007) ﬁnd that a 10% increase in bilateral trade
raises bilateral asset holdings by 6% to 7% in a simultaneous gravity-equations framework.
6.3 Domestic and Foreign Asset Turnover Rates
In section 5.4, wederived thethird andkeyprediction ofthemodel: ifassetsare abundant, then,
not only do asset and consumption home bias coexist, but also foreign assets turn over faster
than domestic assets. This result is robust to different deﬁnitions of domestic asset turnover
rates. The key insight behind it is that asset ﬂows used to compute foreign turnover rates do not
only account for portfolio rebalancing, but also reﬂect the use of assets to facilitate trade.
Empirically, Tesar and Werner (1995) were the ﬁrst to document considerably higher for-
eign over domestic turnover rates (as deﬁned in section 5.4.2) for the year 1989 for ﬁve major
economies: United States, Japan, Germany, United Kingdom, and Canada. Warnock (2002) re-
vised the authors’ estimates for the United States and Canada and in addition presented new
estimates for the pair of countries for the year 1997. Finally, Amadi and Bergin (2008) repeated
Warnock’s (2002) exercise using CPIS data for the United States, Japan, Germany, and Canada
during the 1993-2001 period, and concluded that, on average, foreign turnover rates are twice
14 We use the Grand Total Import statistic, which includes imports across all commodity categories. Bilateral
import data for the service sector are not available. In any case, including service trade should not affect our
results, since services are mostly non-tradable and they account for a tiny portion of overall trade.
25as high as those of home assets. It is the coexistence of higher foreign over domestic turnover
rates with consumption and asset home bias that puzzles the international ﬁnance literature.
Amadi and Bergin (2008) offer an explanation for the coexistence of asset home bias and a
higher turnover rate of foreign over domestic assets. The authors argue that a portfolio-choice
model with a heterogeneous per-unit trading cost and a homogenous ﬁxed entry cost produces
an environment that is consistent with this stylized fact. While this mechanism may be in part
responsible for the observations in the data, we argue that there is considerable room for an ex-
planation that buildson our liquiditychannel. First, unlike ourframework, AmadiandBergin’s
(2008) model does not link consumption and asset home bias, which is a regularity observed in
the data. Second, our model generates a unique testable prediction that relates bilateral asset
turnover rates to bilateral trade in goods, which is not shared by the alternative framework.
6.3.1 Unique Testable Prediction: Asset Turnover and Trade
In section 5.4.1, we derived a unique prediction of our model: a given importer turns over faster
the assets of the country from which it imports more. To test this prediction, we supplement
the data on bilateral import and equity holding shares from section 6.2 with US Treasury data
on annual gross ﬂows of foreign assets between the US and each of its trading partners in our
sample. This allows us to compute bilateral foreign turnover rates for the US during the 2002-
2007 period. According to our model, there should be a positive correlation between US import
shares by source and the US turnover rate of assets from the same source.
Table 3: Logged Bilateral Import Shares and Turnover Rates, 2002-2007
year correlation p-value # obs
2002 0.5466 0.0039 26
2003 0.4223 0.0316 26
2004 0.4662 0.0164 26
2005 0.3364 0.0929 26
2006 0.4210 0.0322 26
2007 0.4521 0.0204 26
Note: # obs = # US trading partners in sample
Table 3 shows the correlation between logged bilateral import shares and logged bilateral
turnover rates for the USand its trading partners during the 2002-2007period.15 The correlation
ranges between 0.3364and 0.5466and it is statistically signiﬁcant at the 5%(10%) level (in 2005).
These ﬁndings provide direct support for the liquidity mechanism over the alternative.
15 We conduct the analysis in logs because import shares and turnover rates have different units.
267 Discussion
In sections 5 and 6, we documented three stylized facts and we demonstrated that the simple
model proposed in this paper can reconcile them. However, in order to remain tractable, the
model assumed away the risky nature of equity returns. We argue that incorporating stochastic
asset returns into the model will not affect the qualitative results.
Suppose that asset returns are stochastic, but not perfectly correlated across countries. In
a symmetric two-country world without a liquidity mechanism, agents will hold equal shares
of domestic and foreign assets in their portfolios. Adding the liquidity mechanism and foreign
asset transaction costs will tilt agents’ portfolios toward domestic assets—the higher the cost,
the higher the degree of asset home bias. For given probability to trade abroad, higher trans-
action costs will also increase consumption home bias. Finally, foreign turnover will continue
to exceed domestic turnover because of the liquidity mechanism. Hence, the frameworks will
differ in the parameter restrictions necessary in order to generate the desirable predictions.
Moreover, our analysis is robust to the introduction of ﬁat money in the economy. In that
case, agents will hold assets as store of value due to positive asset returns since ﬁat money has
negative or zero return, depending on the rate of inﬂation. Suppose that we impose the stan-
dard currency-area assumption in the model; namely, trade in DMi necessitates the use of i’s
currency. If it is costly to convert foreign assets into home currency, due to a spread in the ex-
change rate, agents will hold i’s asset in order to trade in i’s currency. Hence, all of our results
would be preserved. Moreover, since ﬁat money will serve as a medium of exchange in the
economy, the model would predict that total domestic assets—the sum of real assets and ﬁat
money—will turn over faster than total foreign assets. This is likely the case in the US, where
the velocity of money is high. We abstract from ﬁat currency considerations because the valua-
tion of ﬁat money is dependent on policy, which is beyond the scope of our paper.
Finally, one may question the assumption that both domestic and international credit mar-
kets are imperfect and therefore media of exchange are necessary. To preserve the three key
predictions of the model when the economy is not liquidity constrained, it is sufﬁcient to as-
sume that credit is less perfect in cross-border trade. Admittedly, credit is likely better enforced
in domestic relative to international exchanges of goods and services. While, to the best of our
knowledge, direct evidence on domestic credit enforcement is not available, there exists con-
siderable evidence that international trade is credit-constrained. Amiti and Weinstein (2009)
describe in detail the ﬁnancial aspects of international trade and convincingly argue that credit
is imperfect in cross-border exchange of goods.
In sum, the theoretical results presented in this paper are robust to several extensions of the
model. However, the potential quantitative ﬁt of the model will be sensitive to different mod-
eling assumptions. We leave it to future quantitative work to incorporate the effects of asset
liquidity on asset and consumption home bias as well as asset turnover rates.
278 Conclusion
In this paper, we study optimal asset portfolio choice in a two-country search-theoretic model
of monetary exchange. We allow assets to not only represent claims on future consumption,
but to also serve as media of exchange. In the model, trading in a certain country involves the
exchange of locally produced goods for a portfolio of assets. Assuming foreign assets trade at a
cost, we provide sufﬁcient conditions for the existence of two types of exchange regimes: local
asset dominance and international asset equilibrium.
The model predicts that agents’ portfolios exhibit home bias as long as trading opportuni-
ties abroad are not much more frequent than at home. Since agents hold larger amounts of
domestic over foreign assets, they have larger claims to domestic over foreign consumption
goods. Hence, the mechanism positively links asset and consumption home bias. More im-
portantly, under additional parameter restrictions, foreign assets turn over faster than home
assets because, while the former have desirable liquidity properties, they yield lower future
consumption and are undesirable savings tools. Therefore, our theory offers an answer to a
long-standing puzzle in international ﬁnance: a positive relationship between consumption
and asset home bias coupled with higher turnover rates of foreign over domestic assets.
References
AMADI, A. A., AND P. R. BERGIN (2008): “Understandinginternational portfolio diversiﬁcation
and turnover rates,” Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, 18(2),
191–206.
AMITI, M., AND D. E. WEINSTEIN (2009): “Exports and Financial Shocks,” Working Paper
15556, National Bureau of Economic Research.
AVIAT, A., AND N. COEURDACIER (2007): “The geography of trade in goods and asset hold-
ings,” Journal of International Economics, 71(1), 22–51.
CAMERA, G., AND J. WINKLER (2003): “International monetary trade and the law of one price,”
Journal of Monetary Economics, 50(7), 1531 – 1553.
COLLARD, F., H. DELLAS, B. DIBA, AND A. STOCKMAN (2009): “Goods Trade andInternational
Equity Portfolios,” The University of Adelaide School of Economics Working Paper, (14).
DUFFIE, D., N. GARLEANU, AND L. H. PEDERSEN (2005): “Over-the-Counter Markets,” Econo-
metrica, 73(6), 1815–1847.
28FRENCH, K. R., AND J. M. POTERBA (1991): “Investor Diversiﬁcation and International Equity
Markets,” American Economic Review, 81(2), 222–26.
GEROMICHALOS, A., J. M. LICARI, AND J. SUAREZ-LLEDO (2007): “Monetary Policy and Asset
Prices,” Review of Economic Dynamics, 10(4), 761–779.
HEAD, A., AND S. SHI (2003): “A fundamental theory of exchange rates and direct currency
trades,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 50(7), 1555 – 1591.
HEATHCOTE, J., AND F. PERRI (2007): “The International Diversiﬁcation Puzzle Is Not As Bad
As You Think,” Working Paper 13483, National Bureau of Economic Research.
HNATKOVSKA, V. (2010): “Home bias and high turnover: Dynamic portfolio choice with in-
complete markets,” Journal of International Economics, 80(1), 113–128.
HOLMSTR¨ OM, B., AND J. TIROLE (1998): “Private and Public Supply of Liquidity,” Journal of
Political Economy, 106(1), pp. 1–40.
KIYOTAKI, N., AND J. MOORE (1997): “Credit Cycles,” Journal of Political Economy, 105(2), 211–
48.
KOCHERLAKOTA, N. R. (1998): “Money Is Memory,” Journal of Economic Theory, 81(2), 232–251.
LAGOS, R. (2010): “Asset prices and liquidity in an exchange economy,” Journal of Monetary
Economics, 57(8), 913–930.
(2011): “Asset Prices, Liquidity, and Monetary Policy in an Exchange Economy,” Journal
of Money, Credit and Banking, 43, 521–552.
LAGOS, R., AND G. ROCHETEAU (2008): “Money and capital as competing media of exchange,”
Journal of Economic Theory, 142(1), 247–258.
LAGOS, R., AND R. WRIGHT (2005): “A Uniﬁed Framework for Monetary Theory and Policy
Analysis,” Journal of Political Economy, 113(3), 463–484.
LANE, P. R., AND G. M. MILESI-FERRETTI (2007): “The external wealth of nations mark II:
Revised and extended estimates of foreign assets and liabilities, 1970-2004,” Journal of Inter-
national Economics, 73(2), 223–250.
LESTER, B., A. POSTLEWAITE, AND R. WRIGHT (2008): “Information, Liquidity and Asset
Prices,” PIER Working Paper Archive 08-039, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Depart-
ment of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
LEWIS, K. K. (1999): “Trying to Explain Home Bias in Equities and Consumption,” Journal of
Economic Literature, 37(2), 571–608.
29LUCAS, ROBERT E, J. (1978): “Asset Prices in an Exchange Economy,” Econometrica, 46(6), 1429–
45.
MATSUYAMA, K., N. KIYOTAKI, AND A. MATSUI (1993): “Toward a Theory of International
Currency,” Review of Economic Studies, 60(2), 283–307.
MICHAELIDES, A. (2003): “International portfolio choice, liquidity constraints and the home
equity bias puzzle,” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 28(3), 555–594.
ROCHETEAU, G., AND R. WRIGHT (2005): “Money in search equilibrium, in competitive equi-
librium, and in competitive search equilibrium,” Econometrica, 73(1), 175–202.
TESAR, L. L., AND I. M. WERNER (1995): “Home biasand high turnover,” Journal of International
Money and Finance, 14(4), 467–492.
WARNOCK, F. E. (2002): “Home bias and high turnover reconsidered,” Journal of International
Money and Finance, 21(6), 795 – 805.
WRIGHT, R., AND A. TREJOS (2001): “International Currency,” The B.E. Journal of Macroeco-
nomics, 0(1).
A Theory Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2. The term κ creates a wedge in the valuation of asset i between the seller (cit-
izen of i) and the buyer (citizen of j). A positive amount of asset j will change hands only if
all units of asset i have already been traded. Hence, the solution to the bargaining problem
follows directly from answering the following two questions: 1) If the buyer carried unlimited
amounts of asset i (which is foreign to him but local to the seller), what would be the optimal
level of q to be traded? 2) If the buyer carried zero units of asset i, what would be the optimal
level of q to be traded? It can be easily veriﬁed that the answer to the ﬁrst question is given by
q(ψ) ≡ {q : u′(q) = (ψ + dκ)/(ψ + d)}, which is clearly larger than q∗. Similarly, the answer to
the second question is given by q(ψ) ≡ {q : u′(q) = (ψ + d)/(ψ + dκ)} < q∗.
Given these observations, the suggested solution follows naturally. When tii ≥ q(ψj)/(ψi +
d), asset j never changes hands (cases a and b). If tii ≥ q(ψj)/(ψi +d)qi (case a), qi is equal to the
optimum. However, if tii ∈
 
q(ψj)/(ψi + d),q(ψi)/(ψi + d)
 
(case b), qi is bounded by the real
value of the buyer’s asset-i holdings, i.e. tii(ψi + d). If tii < q(ψj)/(ψi + d) (case c), some asset
j is traded as well. If the total asset balances are such that πi ≥ q(ψj) (case c1), then the buyer
gives up all her asset i and enough asset j so that the quantity q(ψj) can be purchased. On
the other hand, if πi < q(ψj) (case c2), the buyer gives up all her asset holdings and purchases
qi = πi = (ψi + d)tii + (ψj + dκ)tji.




FH > 0 and deﬁne q0 ≡ {q : (ψ + d)t0
HH + (ψ + dκ)t0
FH}, i.e. the quantity of the special good that
(t0
HH,t0
FH) can buy. The buyer can purchase q0 by setting tFH = 0 and increasing her domestic
asset holdings to t1
HH = q0/(ψ + d). We claim that the buyer always achieves a higher value if
she purchases (the arbitrarily chosen) q0 with asset holdings (t1
HH,0) rather than (t0
HH,t0
FH). To
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After some algebra, one can show that V B
H(t1
HH,0) > V B
H(t0
HH,t0




FH. Multiply the last expression by ψ + d and add and subtract the term κt0
FH on
the right-hand side. Then, one can conclude that V B
H(t1
HH,0) > V B
H(t0
HH,t0
FH) is true if and only if
κt0
FH > 0, which is true by assumption. Thus, the optimal strategy for the buyer is to purchase
any desired q in the local DM by carrying only the domestic asset.
When ψ = ψ∗, the cost of carrying home assets is zero. We have tHH ≥ q∗/(ψ + d), because
the buyer carries any tHH which is greater than the amount that buys her q∗.
Proof of Lemma 5. The description of the optimal choice of tHF is more complex than the one of
tFF for the following reason. If the buyer does not use foreign assets as media of exchange,
we know that tFF = 0. This is true because the cost of holding foreign assets is always strictly
positive. However, with home assets, if ψ = ψ∗, the buyer might want to hold some home assets
even if she is not using them to carry out transactions in the DM. To avoid these complications,
ﬁrst we focus on the case where ψ > ψ∗. Once we have established which assets serve as means
of payments in the various cases, we let ψ = ψ∗ and conclude the description of the optimal
choice of home assets.
The symmetric, steady-state version of the buyer’s objective function, i.e. equation (6), is
V
B
F (tHF,tFF) = [−ψ + β (ψ + d)]tHF + [−ψ + β (ψ + dκ)]tFF
+ βpF [u(qF(tHF,tFF)) − (ψ + d)xH(tHF,tFF) − (ψ + dκ)xF(tHF,tFF)], (a.1)
where xH denotes the amount of domestic assets (with respect to the buyer’s citizenship) and
xF the amount of foreign assets that change hands in a DM meeting in the foreign country.
Since different asset holdings tHF,tFF lead to different expressions for the terms qF,xH and xF
(determined in Lemma 2), it is of no use to take ﬁrst-order conditions in (a.1). Instead, we
look into different combinations of tHF,tFF holdings. We start by ruling out several regions of
asset holdings as strictly dominated. This allows us to narrow down the set of possibilities and
eventually take ﬁrst-order conditions in the remaining relevant regions. Figure 2 depicts the






















Step 1: The optimal tHF,tFF can never be such that tFF > q(ψ)/(ψ + d). This represents
region I in Figure 2 and case (a) in Lemma 2. To see why this claim is true, just notice that for
any tHF,tFF in this region the buyer is already buying the highest possible quantity of special
good, namely q(ψ). Hence, increasing tFF has a strictly positive cost and no beneﬁt.
Step 2: The optimal tHF,tFF can never be such that tFF ∈ (q(ψ)/(ψ + d), q(ψ)/(ψ + d)] and
tHF > 0. This represents region II, excluding the vertical axis, in Figure 2 and case (b) in Lemma
2. Tosee why the claim is true, recall from Lemma 2 that for this region of asset holdings xH = 0.
Therefore, there is no beneﬁt from carrying the home asset (but there is a cost). Hence, in this
region the objective function becomes
V
B
F (tHF,tFF) = −βκtFF + βpF [u((ψ + d)tFF) − (ψ + dκ)tFF]. (a.2)
The optimal tFF is determined by taking the ﬁrst-order condition in (a.2).
Step 3: The optimal tHF,tFF cannot lie in the interior of region III in Figure 2 (and case (c1) in
Lemma 2). To see why this is true, consider any point in the interior of region III, such as point
1 with coordinates (t1
HF,t1
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32Now consider the following experiment. Leave tFF unchanged, but reduce tHF so that the
















FF) = [−ψ + β (ψ + d)]
q(ψ) − (ψ + d)t1
FF
ψ + dκ









− (ψ + d)
 
q(ψ) − (ψ + d)
ψ + dκ
 



























which is strictly positive by Lemma 3 and the fact that t2
HF < t1
HF. Hence, the agent will never
choose a point (tHF,tFF) in the interior of region III.
Step 4: Finally consider the region of tHF,tFF represented by region IV (case (c2) of Lemma
2). The objective function in this region becomes
V
B
F (tHF,tFF) = [−ψ + β (ψ + d)(1 − pF)]tHF + [−ψ + β (ψ + dκ)(1 − pF)]tFF
+ βpFu((ψ + dκ)tHF + (ψ + d)tFF)
= −a1tHF − a2tFF + a3u(a4tHF + a5tFF), (a.5)
where we deﬁned a1 ≡ ψ−β (ψ + d)(1−pF), a2 ≡ ψ−β (ψ + dκ)(1−pF), a3 ≡ βpF, a4 ≡ ψ+dκ,
and a5 ≡ ψ + d. Notice that ai > 0 for all i, a1 < a2, and a4 < a5. The ﬁrst order-conditions in
(a.5) with respect to tHF,tFF, are
−a1 + a3u
′(a4tHF + a5tFF)a4 ≤ 0, = 0 if tHF > 0, (a.6)
−a2 + a3u
′(a4tHF + a5tFF)a5 ≤ 0, = 0 if tFF > 0. (a.7)
Hence, the optimal choice of tHF,tFF is a corner solution, with the exception of the knife-edge
case in which a2/a1 = a5/a4. If a2/a1 > a5/a4, then tHF > 0 and tFF = 0. On the other hand, if
a2/a1 < a5/a4, then tHF = 0 and tFF > 0.
Using the deﬁnitions of the ai terms, one can show that a2/a1 < a5/a4 if and only if
β(1 − pF)(2d − κ) < ψ[1 − 2β(1 − pF)]. (a.8)
First, notice that if β ≥ 1/(2(1 − pF)) (region R4 in Figure 1), the condition in (a.8) can never
hold, since the left-hand side is positive. In this case, tFF = 0 and the value of tHF is given by
(a.6), which after replacing for the ai terms is equivalent to (9).
33From now on let β < 1/(2(1 − pF)). The condition in (a.8) becomes
ψ >
β(1 − pF)(2d − κ)
1 − 2β(1 − pF)
≡ ψc. (a.9)
Using the deﬁnition of ψc above and recalling the deﬁnition of the “fundamental value” of the
asset, ψ∗ ≡ βd/(1 − β), one can show that ψ∗ > ψc if and only if
κ(1 − β)(1 − pF) > d(1 − 2pF). (a.10)
After some algebra, it turns out that the inequality in (a.10) holds if either: i) pF ≥ 1/2 (region
R1 in Figure 1) or ii) pF < 1/2, β < pF/(1 − pF) and κ/d > (1 − 2pF)[(1 − β)(1 − pF)]−1 ≡ ˜ κ (the
values of β and pF described here are represented by region R2 in Figure 1). However, Lemma
3 indicates that any equilibrium price satisﬁes ψ ≥ ψ∗. Therefore, if ψ∗ > ψc, the inequality in
(a.9) is always true. In this case, tHF = 0 and the value of tFF is given by (a.7). After replacing
for the ai terms, this is equivalent to (8).
We are left with the case in which either β,pF fall in region R3 of Figure 1 or they fall in
region R2 and also κ/d ≤ ˜ κ. Here, ψ∗ ≤ ψc, and there will exist equilibrium prices that can be
larger or smaller than ψc (this will be determined later when we introduce the supply of the
assets, T). For ψ’s that are large enough, so that (a.9) holds, the optimal choice of the agent
satisﬁes tHF = 0, tFF > 0. For ψ ∈ [ψ∗,ψc), we have tHF > 0, tFF = 0. In the knife-edge case
where ψ = ψc, we have tHF,tFF > 0, and both (a.6), (a.7) hold with equality. The choices of
tHF,tFF cannot be separately pinned down, but they are such that the quantity bought in the
DM satisﬁes u′(qF) = pF/(1 − pF).
Step 5: In this step we establish the statements of Lemma 5 for ψ > ψ∗ (which we have as-
sumed so far). The case in which ψ = ψ∗ is discussed in Step 6. Let us summarize the results
derived so far. From Step 1, we know that the agent will never choose tHF,tFF in region I. From
Step 2, we know that if the agent wishes to purchase qF > q(ψ), she will do so by using tFF only.
From Step 3, we know that points in the interior of region III are dominated by asset holdings
that purchase the same quantity, i.e. q(ψ), using fewer home assets. Finally, from Step 4, we
know that if the agent wishes to purchase qF ≤ q(ψ), she will do so by using either tFF or tHF,
but not both, as a medium of exchange.
Case 1: If parameter values are as in Case 1 of the lemma, the agent uses only tFF as a
medium of exchange. Hence, the objective function is given by (a.2), and the optimal choice of
tFF is described by (8).
Case 2: Next, consider parameter values as in Case 2 of the lemma. This case is less straight-
forward than Case 1. We have shown (Step 4) that if the agent wishes to purchase some
qF ≤ q(ψ), she is better off by setting tFF = 0. But from Step 1 we also know that if qF > q(ψ)
the agent is better of using the foreign asset as a medium of exchange. To establish Case 2 of
34the lemma, we need to exclude the latter possibility. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that the
agent wants to purchase qF > q(ψ) and, therefore, chooses tFF > 0. Under the contradictory
assumption, the quantity of special good purchased is
qF(ψ) ≡
 




Notice three important facts. First, qF(ψ) is strictly decreasing in ψ. Second, q(ψ) is strictly









∗)) = 1 +
κ(1 − pF)(1 − β)
dpF
.
Our claim that qF(ψ∗) < q(ψ∗) will be true if and only if u′ (qF(ψ∗)) > u′ 
q(ψ∗)
 
, which is true if
and only if 1+κ(1−pF)(1−β)/(dpF) > d/[d−κ(1−β)], which after some more manipulations





(1 − pF)(1 − β)
. (a.12)
Since here β ≥ pF/(1−pF), the right-hand side of (a.12) is greater than or equal to 1. Hence, the
inequality in (a.12) is always satisﬁed. Combining these three facts implies that qF(ψ) < q(ψ)
for all ψ, which is a straightforward contradiction to our assumption that the agent purchases
qF > q(ψ) and, therefore, chooses tFF > 0. Hence, the agent chooses to use only the home asset
as a medium of exchange, and (given that ψ > ψ∗) the optimal tHF solves (9).
Case 3: Finally, consider parameters such as in Case 3 of the lemma. We know that if the
agent wishes to purchase qF ≤ q(ψ), we have tFF > 0 if and only if ψ ≥ ψc. Using an argument
identical to the one we used in Case 2, one can show that the agent will never wish to purchase
qF > q(ψ).16 Thus, the analysis in Step 4 fully characterizes the optimal choice of the agent, and
Case 3 of the lemma follows directly.
Step 6: We only need to conclude the description of the optimal choice of tHF when ψ = ψ∗.
In Case 1, the home asset is not used as a medium of exchange. If ψ = ψ∗, the cost of carrying
the home asset is zero. Hence, any tHF ∈ R+ is optimal. In Case 2, the buyer uses the home
asset as a means of payment. Thus, with ψ = ψ∗, she is willing to carry any amount of tHF that
allows her to buy the qF which maximizes the buyer’s surplus in the foreign DM. This quantity
is given by q(ψ∗), implying that any tHF ≥ q(ψ∗)/(d/(1 − β) − κ) is optimal. Finally, in Case 3,
ψ = ψ∗ means that ψ < ψc. Therefore, the optimal behavior of the buyer coincides with Case 2
described above.
16 This follows directly from (a.12), since the term on the right-hand side is just ˜ κ.
35Proof of Proposition 1. The fact that tFH = 0 follows immediately from Lemma 4. The proofs for
parts (a), (b), and (c) are similar. Hence, we only prove part (a) in detail.
The fact that agents use only foreign assets in order to trade in the foreign DM follows from










d − κβ(1 − pF)
βpF(ψ + d)2u′′(qF)
< 0.
Since qH and qF are strictly decreasing in ψ, there exists a critical level of T, T ∗
1, such that T ≥ T ∗
1
implies ψ = ψ∗, which in turn implies qH = q∗ and qF = q∗
F,1 (the latter statement follows
from (7) and (8)). To ﬁnd this critical level use a) the bargaining solutions (ψ + d)tHH = qH,
(ψ + d)tFF = qF, evaluated at ψ = ψ∗, and b) the market clearing condition, which under the
speciﬁc parameter values becomes T = tHH+tFF. This yields T ∗
1 = (1−β)(q∗+q∗
F,1)/d. If T > T ∗
1,
the demand of foreigners for a certain asset is given by tFF = (1 − β)q∗
F,1/d. This allows them to
purchase the maximum possible quantity of foreign special good, q∗
F,1. The rest of the supply,
T, is absorbed by local buyers. Hence, tH = tHH = T − (1 − β)q∗
F,1/d.
When T < T ∗
1, agents are not buying the maximum possible amount of the special good.
Hence, in this range, ψ > ψ∗, qH < q∗, qF < q∗
F,1, and ∂ψ/∂T < 0,∂qH/∂T > 0,∂qF/∂T > 0. As
T → T ∗
1, the liquidity properties of the asset are exploited; ψ reaches the fundamental value,
ψ → ψ∗, and qH, qF reach their upper bounds, namely qH → q∗ and qF → q∗
F,1.
Proof of Lemma 6. a) Let T < T ∗
1. i) The monotonicity of qH(pH) and qF(pF) follows from the
fact that u′′ < 0. The monotonicity of tH(pH) and tF(pF) follows trivially from the bargaining
solution. ii) For some pH = pF = p ∈ (0,1), pH(p) > pF(p) will be true if and only if u′ (qH) <
u′ (qF). After some algebra, one can show that this is equivalent to 0 < κ(1 − p), which is
always true. iii) The fact that ˜ pH(pF) < pF follows directly from parts (i) and (ii). Given the
deﬁnition of ˜ pH(pF) and the fact that qH(pH) is increasing, for any pF and pH > ˜ pH(pF), we have
qH(˜ pH(pF)) > qF(pF). iv) The result follows directly from part (iii) and the bargaining solution.
b) Let T ≥ T ∗
1. The facts qH = q∗, qF = q∗
F,1, tH = T − q∗
F,1(1 − β)/d, and tF = q∗
F,1(1 − β)/d are
already presented in Proposition 1. Also, q∗ > q∗
F,1 follows directly from the deﬁnition of q∗
F,1.
To see why T − q∗
F,1(1 − β)/d > q∗


















where the last inequalty uses the fact that q∗ > q∗
F,1. This concludes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 2. We prove that the expressions on the left-hand sides of (10) and (11) are
greater than 0.5. The derivation of these expressions is relegated to Appendix B.
36a) If for a given pF, pH > ˜ pH(pF), the inequality in (10) follows immediately from Lemma 6.






F,1 (2 − pF).
This is always satisﬁed since, by Lemma 6, tH = T − q∗
F,1(1 − β)/d > tF = q∗
F,1(1 − β)/d.
B Accounting Appendix
Although agents are ex-ante identical, their decisions in the CM, regarding how many hours to
work or whether they should visit the ﬁnancial markets and re-balance their portfolios, depend
on whether they got matched in the local and/or foreign DM. In this Appendix, we focus on
the labor, consumption, and asset-holding decisions of the following seven groups: 1) sellers
who got matched with a local buyer (group 1), 2) sellers who got matched with a foreign buyer
(group 2), 3) sellers who did not get matched (group 3), 4) buyers who got matched in both
DM’s (group 4), 5) buyers who got matched only in the home DM (group 5), 6) buyers who got
matched only in the foreign DM (group 6), and 7) buyers who did not get matched (group 7).
The measures of these groups are given by: µ1 = ξaSσH/(σH + σF), µ2 = ξaSσF/(σH +
σF), µ3 = ξ(1 − aS), µ4 = σHσFa2
B, µ5 = σHaB (1 − σFaB), µ6 = σFaB (1 − σHaB), and µ7 =
(1 − σHaB)(1 − σFaB). For future reference notice that µ1 = pH, µ2 = pF, µ4 = pHpF, µ5 =
pH (1 − pF), µ6 = pF (1 − pH), and µ7 = (1 − pH)(1 − pF).
Derivation of Home Assets Bias formulas in (10) and (11). We deﬁne asset home bias as the ratio of
the weighted sum of domestic asset holdings over the weighted sum of all asset holdings for all
citizens of a certain country. We count asset holdings in both the CM and the DM and assume
equal weights for the two markets. It is understood that we count asset holdings at the end of
the sub-periods. For example, an agent of group 4 enters the CM with no assets, but re-balances
her portfolio, so at the end of the CM she holds tH of the home asset and tF of the foreign asset.
On the other hand, an agent of group 1 enters the CM with some home assets, but she sells
these assets, so at the end of the CM she holds zero.
a) First consider T ≤ T ∗
1. Let the numerator of the asset home bias formula (weighted sum
of domestic asset holdings) be denoted by AH. Given the strategy described above,
AH = tH + pHtF + pFtF + (1 − pH)tH.
The ﬁrst term is the total home asset holdings in the CM, i.e. tH times the total measure
of buyers (one). Sellers hold zero assets in the CM. The second term represents home asset
37holdings in the DM by sellers who got matched with local buyers. The third term represents
home asset holdings in the DM by sellers who got matched with foreign buyers. Recall that
we are describing the local asset dominance regime. Hence, foreign buyers pay sellers in local
assets. The last term represents home asset holdings in the DM by the buyers who did not get
matched in the local DM and, hence, hold some domestic assets (groups 6 and 7). After some
algebra one can conclude that AH = 2tH + pFtF.
Following similar steps, one can show that the denominator of the asset home bias formula
(weighted sum of all asset holdings), is given by AT = 2(tH + tF). From market clearing, tH +
tF = T. Therefore, (10) follows immediately.
b) Consider T > T ∗
1. Now the cost of carrying home assets is zero. As a result, buyers carry
more assets than what they use in the DM as media of exchange. Therefore, agents from groups
4 and 5, who previously did not show up in the expression AH, will now carry some home asset











































The ﬁrst term is the total home asset holdings in the CM (held by buyers whose measure is
one). The second term represents home asset holdings in the DM by sellers who got matched
with local buyers. The third term represents home asset holdings in the DM by sellers who got
matched with foreign buyers. The fourth term represents home asset holdings in the DM by
buyers who got matched in the local DM (groups 4 and 5). Finally, the ﬁfth term stands for the

















One can alsoshow that the denominator of the asset home biasformula is given by AT = 2T.
Hence, (11) follows immediately.
Proof of Proposition 3. a) Let Ci
F, Ci
H be the value of foreign and domestic consumption for the
typical agent in group i, i = 1,...,7, respectively. All consumption is denominated in terms of
the general good. Moreover, let Hi denote the hours worked by the typical agent in group i,
i = 1,...,7. All agents consume X∗ in the CM, so agents with many assets will work fewer
hours. Sometimes it will be useful to directly use the agents’ budget constraint and replace X∗
with more informative expressions. First, consider sellers. We have C1
H = C2
H = C3




F = 0. Clearly, even sellers who matched with foreign buyers have no imported
38consumption, since in the local asset dominance regime, sellers get payed in local assets.
Unlike sellers, buyers might also consume in the DM. For group 4, we have C4
H = X∗ +
(ψ + d)tH = X∗ + qH, where qF represents DM consumption. Also, C4
F = (ψ + d)tF = qF.
Group 5 does not match abroad, hence these agents carry some foreign assets into the CM,
which in turn implies that some of their CM consumption is imported. Clearly, C5
F = dκtF.
On the other hand, C5
H = H5 + dtH.17 For group 6, all CM consumption (X∗) is domestic and
all DM consumption, qF, is imported. Finally, group 7 consumes only in the CM. We have
C7
H = H7 − dtH and C7
F = dκtF.
The analysis in the previous paragraph reveals that pH > ˜ pH(pF), implies Ci
H > Ci
F for all
groups except 6, for which the inequality could be reversed, depending on the magnitude of
X∗. To prove the desired result we contrast the domestic and foreign consumption for groups



















From the budget constraint of group 2, we have C2
H = X∗ = H2 + qF. Also, from the analysis
above, C2
F = 0. Hence, (b.1) holds if and only if
pF(H
2 + qF) + pF (1 − pH)X
∗ ≥ pF (1 − pH)qF ⇔
pFH
2 + pF (1 − pH)X
∗ ≥ −pHpFqF,
which is always true, since X∗,Hi ≥ 0.
b) Like in part (a), C1
H = C2
H = C3
H = X∗ and C1
F = C2
F = C3
F = 0. For group 4 C4
H =
X∗ + q∗ and C4
F = q∗
F,1. For group 5 CM consumption (X∗) can be broken down into domestic,
H5+dT −q∗−(1−β)q∗
F,1, and imported, dκ(1−β)q∗
F,1/d. In the DM all consumption is domestic
and equal to q∗. Hence, C5
H = H5 + dT − (1 − β)q∗
F,1 and C5
F = dκ(1 − β)q∗
F,1/d. For group
6 all CM consumption (X∗) is domestic and all DM consumption, q∗
F,1, is imported. Finally,
group 7 only consumes in the CM. From this group’s budget constraint, it follows that C7
H =
H7 + dT − (1 − β)q∗
F,1 and C5
F = dκ(1 − β)q∗
F,1/d.
It is clear that for i = 1,2,3,4, Ci
H > Ci
F. For groups 5 and 7 the same argument is true, but it
is less obvious, hence we prove it formally below. For group 6 this argument need not be true.
Consider group 5. C5
H > C5
F will be true if and only if
H









17 To see this point, notice that this agent’s budget constraint is X∗ + ψ (tH + tF) = H5 + (ψ + dκ)tF or X∗ =
H5 − ψtH + dκtF, where dκtF is imported CM consumption and H5 − ψtH is domestic CM consumption. Since
domestic DM consumption is given by (ψ + d)tH, we have C5
H = H5 + dtH.
39But here T > T ∗
1, which implies
dT > (1 − β)(q
∗ + q
∗
F,1) ⇔ dT > 2(1 − β)q
∗















F for all i, except possibly group 6. However, as in part (a), one can




F, which implies that CH > CF also holds.
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